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JENNIFER TOOLE, WILLIAM LAWRENCE, JARRETT PERLOW, ADIL AI-LMAD HAQUE,
FAHAD HABIB, HEATHER VAN SLOOTEN, KAREN WOODY AND PHILLIP DYE, JR.*
I. Service of Process Abroad
A. INTRODUCTION
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the service of process outside
the United States in civil actions brought in federal courts.' In state courts, the particular
procedures of the forum state apply. In either case, however, where service is to be made
in a foreign state that is a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents (Hague Convention), the Supreme Court has di-
rected that the Hague Convention provides the exclusive means for effecting service on
* Jennifer Toole edited this submission. She is an Attorney-Adviser for the Office of the Legal Adviser, at
the U.S. Department of State. The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the
Department of State or the U.S. Government. The section regarding service of process abroad was contrib-
uted by William Lawrence, Partner at Frommer Lawrence & Haug, LLP in New York, N.Y. Mr. Lawrence
wishes to extend a special thanks to Rami Bardenstein, an associate with Frommer Lawrence & Haug LLP,
for his research. The section personal jurisdiction was prepared by Jarrett Perlow, Staff Attorney, United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria, Va.; the views expressed are those of the
author and not necessarily those of the district court or the United States Government. The section concern-
ing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was contributed by Jennifer Toole, Attorney-Adviser, Office of the
Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily
those of the Department of State or the U.S. Government. Phillip Dye, Jr., Partner at Vinson & Elkins LLP
in Houston, Texas, contributed the section on forum non conveniens. The section regarding the Act of State
Doctrine was contributed by Adil Ahmad Haque, a law clerk at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, N.Y.,
who is awaiting admission to the New York State Bar. Fahad Habib, an associate at Jones Day, Washington,
D.C., contributed the section regarding international discovery; the views herein are of the author and do not
necessarily reflect those of Jones Day. The section on extraterritorial application of U.S. law was authored by
Heather Van Slooten, Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State. The views
expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of State or the U.S. Govern-
ment. The section concerning the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and judgments was contributed by
Karen Woody, attorney at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP.
1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f) (governs service upon individuals in a foreign country); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h) (governs
service of process upon corporations and associations); 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (2003) (service of process on foreign
states and their agencies and instrumentalities must generally be effected in accordance with the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act).
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the territory of a signatory state.2 As discussed below, 2006 saw federal courts continuing
to disagree as to whether service of process through the mail is authorized under the
Hague Convention. In addition, courts considered alternative means of service where
effective service under the Hague Convention was not possible.
B. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION
1. Service by Mail under Hague Convention Article 10(a)
Article 10(a) of the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudi-
cial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters states that as long as the "State of destina-
tion does not object, the present convention shall not interfere with (a) the freedom to
send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad." 3 The interpreta-
tion of the word "send" in Article 10(a) has been a continuing source of controversy in
litigation in the United States.
In its October 16, 2006, decision in Rogers v. Kasabara, the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey recognized that while several district courts in the Third Circuit
and the Eighth Circuit take the view that Article 10(a) does not authorize service via
registered mail, other district courts in the Third Circuit, as well as the Second Circuit
and the U.S. Department of State, view Article 10(a) as authorizing service via postal
channels. 4 Faced with this split in authority, the Rogers court held that the plaintiff's
transmission of a Summons and Complaint via DHL to a Japanese defendant was proper
service of process via postal channels under Article 10(a) of the Hague Convention.5
In reaching its decision, the Rogers court made a number of findings. First, the court
found that Japan. had not technically objected to Article 10(a) and, therefore, there was
tacit agreement to the provisions of Article 10(a) without a formal objection.6 Second,
citing EQI Corp. v. Medical Marketing,7 the Rogers court held that the plain meaning of
Article 10(a) permitted service of process, referring to the Webster dictionary definition of
the word "send" as meaning "to cause to be carried to a destination" and by analyzing the
words "judicial" and "documents" to include documents served as part of service or pro-
cess.8 The court reasoned that if Article 10(a) was not intended to effect service,
2. Volkswagenwerk AG v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
3. Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters art. 10, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 1361.
4. Rogers v. Kasahara, No. 06-2033, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74870, at *9-12 (D. N.J. Oct. 16, 2006).
5. Id. at *13.
6. Id. at *7-8.
While Japan has not expressly approved the use of postal channels as effective service of process,
it has not technically objected to Article 10(a). In order for an objection to any of the Hague
Convention's provisions to be valid, a country must register its formal objection pursuant to Arti-
cle 21. Failure to do so is tacit agreement to all provisions ratified without an accompanying
formal objection . . . Japan registered objections for Articles 10(b) and (c), but registered no
objections to Article 10(a).
Id.
7. EOI Corp. v. Med. Mktg. Ltd, 172 F.R.D. 133, 141 (D. NJ. 1997).
8. Rogen, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74870, at *10.
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[there could be] no other interpretation but to bar the sending of judicial documents
to countries that objected to it once service had been effected. This would make
continuing litigation with foreigners onerous, if not impossible. Once service of pro-
cess had been effected, postal channels would be closed to the parties as a further
means of communication. 9
Third, the Rogers court relied on the fact that the U.S. State Department recognized
Article 10(a) as permitting service of process by mail and on statements of a leading Hague
Convention commentator, Bruno Ristau, who has taken the position that unless a con-
tracting state has objected to service of process by mail, service of judicial documents by
mail is authorized by Article 10(a).10
The Rogers case is not the only recent decision addressing whether service of process via
registered mail to a Japanese defendant is proper. A little more than a month after the
Rogers court found thatJapan had agreed tacitly to Article 10(a) of the Hague Convention,
in University of Pittsburg v. Hedrick, a New York federal district court came to the opposite
conclusion and found that service on a Japanese company could not be made by mail
because "Japan is a signatory to the Hague Convention, but has objected to service by mail
under [the] Hague Convention."'l The Hedrick court concluded that "service upon a Jap-
anese corporation must be made through the Japanese central authority." 12
In a third Article 10(a) case decided in 2006, Darko v. Megabloks, Inc., the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, granted a Canadian corpora-
tion's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the service on it by mail in Canada was
ineffective.13 Despite a ruling in November 2005 by the same court that service of process
via registered mail to Canadian defendants was proper under the Hague Convention, 14 the
Darko court held that because the website of the Canadian central authority instructed
that Canada did not permit service by mail, the plaintiffs service through such means was
ineffective.15
In dicta, the Darko court opined on whether the Hague Convention even permits ser-
vice by mail, noting the split between the circuits on this issue, and concluded that it did
not.' 6 The Darko court noted that the Second Circuit's determination that Article 10(a)
permits service of process through the mail has been criticized and disapproved by federal
courts as "both dicta and based on a California state case that was later overruled."i 7 The
Darko court also relied upon the Supreme Court's finding in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesell-
9. Id. at *11.
10. Id. at *12.
11. Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Hedrick, No. 06-MC-176, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84193, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov.
20, 2006).
12. Id. Although the Hague Convention outlines several methods in which service of process can be per-
formed, the least controversial is the use of the foreign country's central authority. Under this procedure, the
document to be served is transmitted to the central authority designated by the foreign signatory state,
whereupon the designated central authority serves the document in accordance with its domestic law.
13. Darko, Inc. v. Megabloks, Inc., No. 06-CV-1374, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74542, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Oct.
13, 2006).
14. Sibley v. Alcan, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1055 (N.D. Ohio. 2005) (holding that Article 10(a) of the
Hague Convention allows service via mail to Canada because Canada had not objected to Article 10(a)).
15. Darko, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74542, at *4.
16. Id. at *5 (citations onitted).
17. Id.
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schaft v. Schlunk that "the term 'service of process' has a well-established technical mean-
ing"' 8 to conclude that the Hague Convention does not permit service of process by
mail.' 9
2. Service by Other Means under Article 19 of the Hague Convention
In MPS IP Services Corp. v. Modis, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Florida held that service via "facsimile and regular mail would not appear to offend either
the Hague Convention or the laws of British Columbia."20 In MPS, the plaintiffs had
been in contact with the defendants through the defendants' website but were unable to
effect service through traditional means because the defendants lacked a current valid ad-
dress. The plaintiff moved the court for permission to serve the defendants by alternate
means such as email, facsimile and regular mail. The court held that "Article 19 of the
Hague Convention permits service by any method allowed by the internal laws of the
country in which service is made."2' It found that Canadian court rules permitted court
ordered substituted service in situations in which it was impracticable to serve in another
manner, so it granted the plaintiff's motion. 22
C. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER RULE 4 OF THE FEDER-AL RULES OF CML PROCEDURE
In Martinez v. White, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
found that a defendant who was incarcerated in a Mexican jail and was refusing service of
process could be served through his attorney under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(f)(3), which provides for service "by 'other means not prohibited by international agree-
ment as may be directed by the court.'"23 Service had been made by mailing a copy of the
Summons and Complaint, return receipt requested, by the clerk of the court to the jail
where the defendant was incarcerated. Mhile the case did not address the Hague Con-
vention, the ruling was still consistent with an interpretation of the service of process
requirements of the Hague Convention which permit service through postal channels.
Recently, a district court in the Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division, also
dealt with the permissibility of alternative service of process but found the plaintiff's
methods ineffective. In United States v. Bentonsports PLC, the U.S. government filed a civil
complaint against a corporation with offices in London and Costa Rica to enjoin the con-
tinuing operation of an internet and telephone gambling service. 24 The U.S. government
was unsuccessful in an attempt to serve a director of Bentonsports when he was arrested in
Texas. This person was subsequently relieved of his duties at Bentonsports, and the U.S.
government then attempted to serve process by (1) personally serving an attorney, who
18. Volkrwagernwerk, 486 U.S. at 700.
19. Darko, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74542, at *5-6.
20. MPS IP Serv. v. Modis Commc'ns, Inc., No. 06-cv-270-J-20HTS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34473, at *3
(.M.D. Fl. May 30, 2006).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Martinez v. White, No. 06-1595 CRB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73654, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2006).
24. United States v. Bentonsports PLC, No. 4:06CV1064 (CEJ), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55553 (E.D. Mo.
Aug. 9, 2006).
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the government claimed represented Bentonsports, and (2) sending a facsimile to Benton-
sports' offices in London and Costa Rica.
The Bentonsports court was faced with three issues. First, was service of process on the
defendant's attorney proper? Second, was service by facsimile to the defendant's London
office proper? And third, was service by facsimile to the defendant's Costa Rica office
proper? As to the first issue, the court found that although Rule 4(0(3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure authorized alternative means, the plaintiff was required to first
obtain a court order permitting the use of those alternative means. 25 As to the second
issue, the court found that since service of process by facsimile was not an approved
method under the Hague Convention, service on the defendant's London office was also
insufficient. 26 As to the third issue, the court held that because Costa Rica is not a signa-
tory to the Hague Convention, the relevant rules for service were supplied by Rules 4(0(2)
and 4(0(3). The court held, however, that neither rule sanctioned service by facsimile in
this case because (a) Costa Rican law did not prescribe this type of service as an acceptable
method (and no Costa Rican court had permitted it pursuant to a letter rogatory) and (b)
no U.S. court had authorized the use of such service either. 27
D. PROOF OF EFFECTIVE SERVICE VIA REGISTERED MAIL
Two notable decisions in 2006 addressed the proof necessary for a plaintiff to show that
service of process via mail was effected. In Tinsley v. ING Group, the plaintiff sought a
default judgment against ING after mailing process to the CEO of the defendant. 28 The
plaintiff provided proof that he mailed the documents by producing a registered mail re-
ceipt and a receipt showing that he had paid for the mailing. However, he did not provide
any documentation that the defendant actually had received the documents.29 The court
held that the plaintiff could not rely on the U.S. Postal Service's delivery schedule to
support his position that service was actually effected on the defendant. Thus, the motion
for a default judgment was denied. 3°
Similarly, in SAT International Corp. v. Great White Fleet (US) Ltd., the district court in
the Southern District of New York held that although service of process via registered
mail was permissible, the plaintiff failed to provide evidence that the Clerk of the Court
addressed and dispatched the summons and complaint to the defendant as requested. 31 In
this admiralty case, which arose because the plaintiff's cargo had been hijacked, the de-
fendants moved for summary judgment and a single defendant moved to dismiss on the
ground that service was not effected properly. The court granted that defendant's motion
to dismiss because the plaintiff failed to establish two requirements of Rule 4(f): (1) "SAT
has failed to provide evidence to the Court that the Clerk of Court for this judicial district
addressed and dispatched the summons and complaint to CLS"; and (2) "SAT failed to file
25. Id. at *5.
26. Id. at *6 n.3.
27. Id. at *8.
28. Tinsley v. ING Group, No. 05-808-KAJ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8267 (D. Del. Mar. 3, 2006).
29. Id. at *4.
30. Id.
31. SAT Int'l Corp. v. Great White Fleet, Ltd., No. 03-Civ. 7481, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10606, at *48
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2006).
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a receipt of service or any other proof of service, with the Clerk of Court for this judicial
district." 32
HI. Personal Jurisdiction
A. PURPOSEFUL AvAImETrr OR DREcTION IN THE FORUM
In Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, by far the most notewor-
thy decision in 2006 regarding the issue of personal jurisdiction, the US. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, considered whether a federal court could
vacate a foreign injunction obtained by foreign defendants. 33 An eight-judge majority
concluded that personal jurisdiction could be exercised over the foreign defendants, but
the en banc panel ultimately ruled that the case was subject to dismissal. 34 The foreign
defendants' petition for Supreme Court certiorari on the question of personal jurisdiction
was denied on May 30, 2006.35
At issue in the Yahoo! case were two French court orders granted in favor of two French
organizations (the foreign defendants) requiring Yahoo "to cease all hosting and availabil-
ity in the territory of [France] from the 'Yahoo.com' site ... of messages, images and text
relating to Nazi objects, relics, insignia, emblems and flags, or which evoke Nazism," and
of "[w]eb pages displaying text, extracts, or quotes from 'Mein Kampf' and the '[Protocols
of the Elders of Zion]' at two specified Internet addresses." 36 The French court also di-
rected Yahoo! "to remove from 'all browser directories accessible in the territory of the
French Republic' the 'index heading entitled 'negationists"' and any link "bringing to-
gether, equating, or presenting directly or indirectly as equivalent" sites about the Holo-
caust and sites by Holocaust deniers. 37
Yahoo! sought a declaratory judgment in federal court in California that the two French
orders were unrecognizable and unenforceable under the First Amendment. 38 In 2001,
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California rejected the foreign de-
32. Id. at *48.
33. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc). For purposes of this section, the term foreign refers exclusively to non-U.S. residents and, contrary to
general practice, does not connote that the party is not a resident or citizen of the forum court.
34. Id. at 1224.
An eight-judge majority of the en banc panel holds, as explained in Part II of this opinion, that the
district court properly exercised specific personal jurisdiction over defendants LICRA and UEJF
under the criteria of Calder. A three-judge plurality of the panel concludes, as explained in Part
m of this opinion, that the suit is unripe for decision under the criteria of Abbott Laboratories.
When the votes of the three judges who conclude that the suit is unripe are combined with the
votes of the three dissenting judges who conclude that there is no personal jurisdiction over
LICRA and UEJF, there are six votes to dismiss Yahoo!'s suit. We therefore REVERSE and
REMAND to the district court with instructions to dismiss without prejudice.
Id. (citations omitted).
35. La Ligue Contre le Racism et L'Antisemitisme v. Yahoo! Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2332 (2006).
36. Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1202-03.
37. Id. at 1203.
38. Id. at 1204. Yahoo! did so even though it had modified its posting policy concerning hate-related
groups before bringing its federal suit and the French organizations never attempted to enforce the orders.
Although the district court concluded that this change did not comply fully with the French orders (id. at
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fendants' contention that the court lacked personal jurisdiction and concluded the suit was
ripe and that the orders were unenforceable under the First Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution. 39 The foreign defendants appealed, arguing that the district court erred in find-
ing personal jurisdiction, and a majority of the three-judge Ninth Circuit panel hearing
the case on appeal agreed that personal jurisdiction was improper over these defendants.40
On rehearing in 2006, the Ninth Circuit en banc panel construed the "purposeful avail-
ment" requirement of Calder v. Jones41 to require that the defendants must have "(1)
committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that
the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state." 42 Concerning the third
factor, the court clarified that the "'brunt' of the harm" need not be suffered exclusively or
even overwhelmingly in the forum state provided "a jurisdictionally sufficient amount of
harm is suffered in the forum state." 43 Applying Calder to the foreign defendants' con-
tacts with California, the court found that, in obtaining the two French orders directing
Yahoo! to take "actions in California, on threat of a substantial penalty," the defendants'
action in France (filing suit) intentionally sought to affect Yahoo!'s activity in California
and thus satisfied the first two factors of Calder.4-
The evaluation of the harm factor was complicated by Yahoo!'s admission that, al-
though it had modified its conduct following the French court's orders, that modification
was unrelated to the orders or threats of financial penalty.45 The defendants further rep-
resented that Yahoo! was in substantial compliance with the French orders, and as such,
they would not seek to enforce the penalty if Yahoo! continued with its planned policy
changes.46 Nonetheless, the court of appeals was concerned that the French orders and
substantial penalty were still enforceable against Yahoo! because the defendants neither
entered into a "binding contractual commitment" not to enforce the orders nor moved the
French court to withdraw the orders.47 In sum, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the extent of
the defendants' contacts with the forum and the degree to which Yahoo!'s suit was related
1205), Yahoo! maintained throughout the litigation that its policy changes were not the result of the defend-
ants' suit (id. at 1210).
39. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racism et L'Antisemitisme, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1180 (N.D.
Cal. 2001) (finding personal jurisdiction over French defendants). Id. at 1194 (granting summary judgment in
favor of Yahoo!).
40. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 379 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2004) (2-
1 decision).
41. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984). "Purposeful availment" is only one of the three factors
used in the Ninth Circuit to evaluated specific jurisdiction. Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1205-06 (listing the other
factors but deeming only the purposeful availment factor to be determinative in this case).
42. lihoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1206 (quoting Scbwar-zenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 803 (9th
Cir. 2004)).
43. Id. at 1207 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984) (recognizing personal jurisdic-
tion when the bulk of harm occurred outside of the forum)). The Ninth Circuit noted that its prior applica-
tions of the "brunt of harm" factor, requiring that the brunt of harm must be suffered with the defendant's
knowledge in the forum state, were based on a misreading of the Calder "brunt of harm" test in Core-Vent
Corp. v. Noel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482 (9th Cir. 1993). See Yahoo!, Inc., 433 F.3d at 1206-07. The court took
comfort in following Keeton over the misreading of Carter in light of the Supreme Court issuing these deci-
sions on the same day. See id. at 1207.
44. Id. at 1209.
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to these contacts, concluding that all of the defendants' contacts with California were
directly related to the orders at issue in the case and therefore created a sufficient basis for
a finding of personal jurisdiction. 4 To decide otherwise, the court reasoned, would "cast a
shadow on the legality of Yahoo!'s current policy."4
9
Although an eight-judge majority concluded that personal jurisdiction existed, six of the
eleven judges on the en banc panel voted for dismissal: three judges believed that there
was no personal jurisdiction and another three judges agreed with the majority's view on
personal jurisdiction but believed the case was not ripe for review. The first set of judges
wrote three separate concurrences in which they each explained why personal jurisdiction
over the French defendants was not proper: one judge found that the orders were directed
to the conduct of Yahoo! (and its French subsidiary) in France with any effects on Califor-
nia being secondary; 50 another judge believed that any contacts with California were inci-
dental and the more-expansive purposeful availment analysis, normally used in
commercial and contract cases, was inappropriate in this case;5' and the third judge
stressed that the actions against Yahoo! were directed to California by the French court,
not the defendants, and concluded that it was "perverse" for the majority to hold that a
citizen of another country should be subject to personal jurisdiction in another country
solely for petitioning a native court for enforcement of local laws.5 2
Although the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss, in
favor of the foreign defendants, the foreign defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for
a writ of certiorari on the question of personal jurisdiction, using, in part, the reasoning of
the three concurrences.5 3 The Supreme Court denied certiorari on May 30, 2006,54 and
at this time, it remains an open question as to whether a U.S. court can enforce a foreign
injunction against locally-objectionable Internet content if the content is permissible in
the United States.5 5
Unlike the Ninth Circuit in the Yahoo! case, in TH Agriculture & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace
European Group Ltd., the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas declined to find
personal jurisdiction when foreign defendants had not purposefully directed their activi-
ties to the forum state.5 6 The Dutch multi-national corporation Koninklijke Philips Elec-
tronics N.V. (Philips) had a global insurance policy covering its many subsidiaries,
including Philips Electronics North American Corporation (PENAC) and PENAC's sub-
48. Id. at 1210-11.
49. Id. at 1211.
50. Id. at 1225 (Ferguson, J., concurring in judgment).
51. Id. at 1231 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring in judgment).
52. Id. at 1232-33 (Tashima, J., concurring in judgment).
53. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme v. Yahhoo! Inc., No.
05-1302, 2006 WL 979267 (Apr. 10, 2006).
54. See generally La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisentitimte, 126 S. Ct. 2332.
55. See FTRF Report to ALA Council, NEWSLETTER ON INTrELLFCiTUAL FREEDOM (Am. Library Ass'n/
Office of Intellectual Freedom), Sept. 1, 2006, available at https://members.ala.org/nif/v55n5/ftrf.html (dis-
cussing the impact of the decision on First Amendment issues the American Library Association raised in its
amicus brief in support of Yahoo!); see also Sari Louis Feraud Int'l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 275
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), appeal docketed, No. 05-5927 (2d Cir. Oct. 26, 2005) (refusing to enforce a French judgment
against a website for posting fashion design images in violation of French law as contrary to the First Amend-
ment). As of March 2007, the Second Circuit had not yet ruled on the Sarl Louis Feraud Int'l appeal.
56. TH Agric. & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group, Ltd., 416 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (D. Kan. 2006).
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sidiaries, including TH Agriculture & Nutrition, LLC (THAN).57 Thirteen insurance
companies, all based in Western Europe, provided the worldwide liability coverage as part
of a comprehensive insurance plan.5 8 THAN, based in Kansas, was named in more than
14,000 asbestos claims and sued the insurance companies for indemnification of these
claims and breach of the insurance policies when the insurance companies refused to pro-
vide indemnity.5 9 The insurance companies also sued Philips, PENAC, and THAN in a
Dutch court to rescind the insurance policies, claiming Philips failed to disclose all rele-
vant information concerning the asbestos litigation.60 In the U.S. court, the insurance
companies argued that they were not subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Kansas
even though they had an insurance contract with a Kansas-based company.6' The district
court agreed, holding that the insurance companies never purposefully directed their ac-
tivities to Kansas,62 but rather only had contact with Kansas by issuing the insurance poli-
cies in the Netherlands to the parent company located in the Netherlands. 6 3 Moreover,
only a "minimum percentage" of the asbestos claims were in Kansas, 64 and the insurance
policy explicitly provided for adjudication of all disputes in a Dutch court and under
Dutch law. 6 5 After evaluating whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction "would offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," the court declined to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction in light of the limited, nonphysical contacts with the forum; 66 the "inter-
national nature" of the suit, including the need to interpret and apply the law of the
Netherlands; and the desire to avoid duplicative, and potentially contradictory, litigation
with the concurrent suit in the Netherlands by the insurance companies.6 7
B. DOING BUSINESS IN THE FORUM
In Erne Shipping, Inc. v. Hamburg Bulk Carriers GMBH & Co. KG,68 a federal district
court declined to exercise personal jurisdiction over a German shipping company hoping
to escape a maritime attachment, Hamburg Bulk Carriers GMBH & Co. KG (HBC).
57. Id. at 1062.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1062-63.
60. Id. at 1063. The court's opinion did not clarify whether the insurance companies sued Philips before or
after Philips initiated the suit in Kansas, only that the Dutch suit was ongoing when the court issued its
opinion in February 2006.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1067.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1065-66 ("Only one of those fourteen thousand asbestos claims was filed in Kansas, three clain-
ants have asserted asbestos claims in other jurisdictions but live in Kansas, and twelve claimants worked in
Kansas at the time of their alleged exposure to asbestos.").
65. Id. at 1067.
66. Id. at 1073. Compare id., witb Telcordia Tech. Inc. v. Telkom SA Ltd., 458 F.3d 172, 177-79 (3d Cir.
2006) (explaining that physical presence is "no longer determinative in light of modem commercial business
arrangements" in considering purposeful availment if a long-term contractual relationship exists between the
parties and the defendant, but still finding personal jurisdiction in the New Jersey forum where a South
African company regularly visited the New Jersey office and deposited contractually-obligated payments in a
New Jersey bank account).
67. TH Agric. & Nutrition, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 1072-73.
68. Erne Shipping, Inc. v. Hamburg Bulk Carriers GMBH & Co. KG, 409 F. Supp. 2d 427 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
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Prior to the case, a New York federal court granted an order of maritime attachment to a
Liberian shipping company, Erne Shipping Inc. (Erne), pending the outcome of an arbi-
tration proceeding in London concerning the breach of maritime contracts between Erne
and HBC.69 Under Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Mari-
time Claims, attachment of a defendant's property is proper if the defendant cannot be
found within the district at the time of filing for attachment.
HBC moved to vacate the attachment, making several arguments as to how it could be
found within the district for purposes of Rule B.70 The court placed HBC's arguments
into three categories based on the nature of the contact with New York: legal; commercial;
and physical. First, HBC registered with the New York State Division of Corporations
"to create a formal presence within the United States in New York City" and appointed a
New York agent to accept service of process, recognizing that these actions would subject
it to suit in New York. 71 Second, HBC maintained several contracts with New York-based
companies, realized a gross profit of $8.79 million from 2000 to 2004 for shipments on
behalf of New York companies, and contracted with New York companies for services
relating to its shipments and vessels.72 Finally, HBC unloaded cargo at the Port of New
York from three of its vessels, marketed its services to New York-based cargo shippers, and
expressed its intent to establish a physical office in New York. 73
To determine whether HBC was "found" in New York, the court evaluated whether
HBC had continuous and systematic contacts with the forum to satisfy the minimum stan-
dards of due process. 74 Because federal due process and the general jurisdiction law of
New York are practically equivalent and apply the same continuous and systematic stan-
dard, 75 HBC needed to demonstrate that it was doing business under New York law by (1)
having a New York office, (2) maintaining bank accounts or other property in New York,
(3) having a New York phone listing, (4) engaging in public relations in or directed at New
York, and (5) having any "individuals permanently located in the state to promote its inter-
ests."76 HBC, however, could only show that a single employee had solicited business in
New York on only one occasion and that its only New York activity in the past five years
concerned "a few contractual arrangements" that reflected only 2 percent of its overall
revenue.77 In rejecting the importance of HBC's state authorization to conduct business,
the district court noted that the filing only signaled HBC's intention to do business in the
69. Id. at 428-29.
70. Id. at 429.
71. Id. at 430.
72. Id. at 430-3 1.
73. Id. at 431.
74. Id. at 433.
75. Id. (citing Beja v. Jahangiri, 453 F.2d 959, 961 (2d Cir. 1972) (federal standard); McGowan v. Smith,
419 N.E.2d 321 (N.Y. 1981) (New York standard)).
76. Erne Shipping, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 434 (quoting Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 226 F.3d 88, 98
(2d Cit. 2000)); see also Overseas Media, Inc. v. Skvortsov, 407 F. Supp. 2d 563, 568-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(finding no personal jurisdiction in copyright infringement action under the New York "doing business"
standard when a Russian corporation, which solicited business from a New York-based company via tele-
phone, e-mail, and in person; had only 0.022% of its total sales revenue from New York customers; and had
no permanent establishment or substantial and continuous sales in New York).
77. Erne Shipping, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 434.
VOL. 41, NO. 2
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 339
state in the future.78 Moreover, the court found that HBC's registration constituted only
its consent to be sued in New York and not a basis for general personal jurisdiction.79
Thus, HBC was not entitled to be "found" within the district under Rule B because it
lacked a physical presence and it could surrender its New York business authorization
unilaterally at any time.80
M. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
A. THE FSIA's DISINcTION BETWEEN A "FOREIGN STATE" AND AN "AGENCY OR
INSTRUMENTALITY OF A FOREIGN STATE"
In 2006, both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals issued decisions addressing the distinctions between a "foreign state" and an
"agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA). The Supreme Court stressed the importance of the distinction in a case in-
volving the FSIA's provisions governing the post judgment attachment of sovereign prop-
erty, and the Second Circuit explored the distinction in a case involving the expropriation
exception to the FSIA.
In Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forced of the Islamic Republic of Iran v.
Elahi, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded a decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals that had not distinguished between a foreign state and its agency or instrumental-
ity for purposes of attachment.8 ' At issue was an order permitting the attachment of an
asset belonging to Iran's Ministry of Defense (MOD), a Swiss arbitration award in the
MOD's favor that had been confirmed by the U.S. Federal District Court for the South-
ern District of California.82 The MOD opposed Elahi's attempt to impose a lien upon the
arbitration award by asserting immunity under the FSIA. The district court rejected the
MOD's immunity argument based upon a finding that the MOD had waived its immunity
when it sought to enforce the award in the United States.83 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
also rejected the MOD's immunity argument but on very different grounds. The Ninth
Circuit disagreed with the district court that the MOD had waived its immunity, holding
that waiver for purposes of jurisdiction on the merits is not waiver for purposes of attach-
ment and execution. It then treated the MOD as an agency or instrumentality "engaged
in commercial activity" and held that the arbitration award in its favor was properly sub-
ject to execution and attachment under the FSIA8 4 The court also held that the award was
78. Id. at 436 (reflecting New York's requirement for a company to undertake a significantly greater level of
in-state activities to qualify as doing business in New York).
79. Id. at 436-37 (implying the consent to suit would likely satisfy a claim of specific personal jurisdiction in
New York).
80. Id. at 438 (reasoning that, if HBC were found in the district, it would undermine the maritime attach-
ment rule, which intended to provide security to the plaintiff and some assurance of the defendant's appear-
ance in the action).
81. Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi, No. 04-
1095, 2006 U.S. Lexis 1817 (Feb. 21, 2006).
82. Id.
83. See Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic
Def. Sys., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1151-52 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
84. See Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic
Def. Sys., 385 F.3d 1206, 1219-22 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b)).
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not immune from attachment pursuant to the military and central bank exceptions to the
FSIA.85
The Supreme Court took issue with the Ninth Circuit's decision for ignoring what the
Court found was a critical difference between the FSIA's exception to sovereign immunity
from attachment for property of a foreign state itself versus the Act's exception for prop-
erty of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state:
The Act, as it applies to the "property in the United States ofaforeigni state," does not
contain the "engaged in a commercial activity" exception that the Ninth Circuit de-
scribed. That exception applies only where the property at issue is property of an
"agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state. The difference is critical.86
The Court also noted the view of the Solicitor General that a defense ministry, such as
the MOD, is not an agency or instrumentality of a state, but, rather is "an inseparable part
of the state itself."87 Declining to answer the question of whether the MOD was an
agency or instrumentality of Iran or the state itself, the Court vacated the judgment and
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.8 As of this writ-
ing, the case is again before the Ninth Circuit.
When the Second Circuit was faced with the question of whether Poland's Ministry of
the Treasury (MOT) was an agency or instrumentality of Poland for purposes of the ex-
propriation exception to immunity from jurisdiction under the FSIA, it concluded that the
MOT was part of the state, itself.8 9 The Second Circuit extended the "core functions"
test of Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana9o to reach this determination. 91
In Transaero, the D.C. Circuit addressed whether the Bolivian Air Force should be con-
sidered the state of Bolivia, itself, or an agency or instrumentality of Bolivia for purposes
of applying the service of process provisions under the FSIA.92 The Transaero court con-
cluded that the status of a foreign entity depends on "whether the core functions of the
foreign entity are predominantly governmental or commercial." 93 The Transaero court
held that "armed forces are as a rule so closely bound up with the structure of the state
that they must in all cases be considered as the 'foreign state' itself, rather than a separate
,agency or instrumentality' of the state."94
Recognizing that the reasoning in Transaero has been applied in different contexts by
federal courts, including the Second Circuit,95 the Garb court relied upon Transaero to
determine whether the core functions of the MOT were "'predominantly commercial or
governmental"' for purposes of determining whether the district court had properly de-
nied subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the MOT was not an agency or instru-
85. Id. at 1222-24 (applying 28 U.S.C. § 161 1(b)).
86. Elahi, 2006 U.S. Lexis 1817, at *4 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Garb v. Repub. of Poland, 440 F.3d 579 (2d Cir. 2006).
90. Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cit. 1994).
91. See Garb, 440 F.3d at 590-98.
92. See Transaero, 30 F.3d at 151-53 (addressing 28 U.S.C. § 1608).
93. Id. at 151.
94. Id. at 153.
95. See Garb, 440 F.3d at 590-94.
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mentality of Poland, but rather part of the foreign state, itself.96 The Garb court reviewed
Poland's constitution, the law governing treasury powers, and an affidavit from a former
Director of the Legal Office of the Polish Senate, each of which indicated that the MOT
acted on behalf of the Polish government. 97 Thus, the Garb court was satisfied that the
district court's determination that the MOT was part of the foreign state was not made in
error.
98
The Garb court rejected two arguments asserted by the plaintiffs based upon the FSIA's
legislative history, specifically a 1976 House Report. 99 First, the plaintiffs relied upon the
House Report's definition of "agency or instrumentality" as an entity which could, inter
alia, "sue or be sued in its own name." 100 The plaintiffs reasoned that because the MOT
could be sued in its own name, it, therefore, was an agency or instrumentality of Poland.
The Garb court did not find this argument persuasive because the language in the House
Report was ambiguous and otherwise contradictory.10 1 In addition, the Garb court found,
as the Transaero court cautioned, such a reading of Congress' intent "would extend the
definition of 'agencies or instrumentalities' 'well beyond' the 'public commercial enter-
prises' that Congress apparently intended to target." 1°2
Second, the plaintiffs pointed to the House Report's statement that "as a general mat-
ter, entities which meet the definition of an 'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state'
could assume a variety of forms, including ... a department or ministry which can and is
suable in its own name." 103 Because the plaintiffs pointed to no case where a ministry,
such as the MOT, qualified as an "agency or instrumentality" under the FSIA and because
the Garb court was aware of two examples where ministries were deemed part of the for-
eign state, the court rejected this argument as well.'0 As a result, the Garb court con-
cluded that the expropriation exception to the FSIA did not apply and upheld the district
court's dismissal of the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." 5
96. Id. at 594 (quoting Transaero, 30 F.3d at 151).
97. Id. at 594-95.
98. Id. at 595.
99. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487.
100. Id. at 15, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614.
101. The Garb court pointed out that "Ji]f the passage invoked by plaintiffs suggests that the Ministry of the
Treasury of Poland is an 'agency or instrumentality' of the Republic of Poland, other statements in the House
Report point in the opposite direction." Garb, 440 F.3d at 596.
102. Id. at 595 (quoting Transaero, supra note 89, at 152).
103. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 15-16, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614.
104. Garb, 440 F.3d at 596.
105. In addition to its holding that the expropriation exception to the FSIA did not apply, the Garb court
also held that: (1) the Supreme Court's decision in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004),re-
quired it to apply the FSIA retroactively; and (2) the commercial activity exception did not apply because
expropriation is not a commercial act, subsequent commercial use of expropriated property is insufficient to
satisfy the commercial activity exception and expropriation claims should not be re-characterized as commer-
cial activity claims.
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B. FSIA EXCEPTIONS TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM JURISDICTION
1. Waiver Exception
The FSIA provides that a foreign state and its agencies and instrumentalities are im-
mune from jurisdiction in U.S. courts unless certain exceptions apply. 10 6 The first excep-
tion outlined in the FSIA permits jurisdiction in U.S. courts over a foreign state in cases
"in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication,
notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may purport to
effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver.' 0 7 In Af-Cap, Inc. v. Republic of
Congo, the Fifth Circuit considered whether the Republic of Congo (Congo) had implic-
itly waived its immunity to suit in Texas in connection with the district court's grant of a
turnover order following a dispute over a loan agreement.1 08 The Af-Cap court found that
the circumstances of the case did not meet the ordinary test for finding an implied waiver,
which requires:
(1) a foreign state agrees to arbitration in another country;
(2) the foreign state agrees that a contract is governed by the laws of a particular coun-
try; [or]
(3) the state files a responsive pleading without raising the immunity defense. '09
There was no arbitration agreement, English law, not U.S. law, governed the loan
agreement, and Congo had repeatedly objected to jurisdiction in the case based on sover-
eign immunity grounds. Because under a narrow construction of the waiver exception the
Af-Cap court could find no implicit waiver, it held that the district court's finding of a
waiver of immunity was an abuse of discretion and vacated the district court's turnover
order.110
2. Commercial Activity Exception
The FSIA's commercial activity exception permits jurisdiction in cases where the act
being challenged is:
based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state;
or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activ-
ity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and
that act causes a direct effect in the United States." I
In Yang Rong v. Liaoning Provincial Government, the plaintiff alleged that a Chinese prov-
ince's expropriation of its shares was a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere
that caused a direct effect in the United States and thus satisfied the FSIA's commercial
activity exception. 1 2 The plaintiff and a municipality of the defendant Chinese province
106. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(a), 1604.
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
108. Al-Cap, Inc. v. Republic of Congo, 462 F.3d 417, 426-27 (5th Cir. 2006).
109. Id. at 426 (quoting Rodriguez v. Transnave Inc., 8 F.3d 284, 287 (sth Cir. 1993)).
110. See id. at 427 (citing Rodriguez, 8 F.3d at 287).
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
112. See Yang Rong v. Liaoning Provincial Government, 452 F.3d 883, 888 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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had entered into a joint venture for the manufacture of automobiles. Subsequently, senior
Chinese officials required that a Chinese entity maintain a majority shareholder owner-
ship interest in the joint venture. A Chinese non-governmental organization (NGO) was
created to fulfill that purpose. In early 2002, the defendant Chinese province ordered that
all equity interests held in the name of the NGO be transferred to the province and ulti-
mately took over the joint venture.' 3
Although the plaintiff argued that all the province's activities, including the participa-
tion of the province's municipality in the joint venture, should be considered in determin-
ing whether the commercial activity exception should apply, the Yang Rong court focused
exclusively on the expropriation of the shares and concluded that the province's declara-
tion that the shares were "state assets" was "an act that can be taken only by a sover-
eign."" 14 The court distinguished the Yang Rong case from Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v.
Iran,' 5 where it found that Iran's takeover of a dairy business was commercial because
there was "'no indication that Iran nationalized Pak Dairy by taking it over through a
process of law.'" 116 In addition, the facts in Yang Rong differed from those in Foremost-
McKesson, where various Iranian entities that held contractual relationships with the plain-
tiff used their majority shareholder position to lock the plaintiff out. Because in Yang
Rong, there was no contractual relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendant prov-
ince and the province did not assume control by the purchase of a majority of shares, the
Yang Rong court concluded that the acts of the province were "a quintessentially sovereign
act.' 17
Furthermore, the Yang Rong court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the province's
use of the expropriated shares was commercial in nature. According to the Yang Rong
court, such a reading of the commercial activity exception would require sovereigns to be
"haled into a Federal Court under FSIA" for "any subsequent disposition of expropriated
property," a result that is inconsistent with FSIA precedent and the FSIA's purpose."l 8
For these reasons, the Yang Rong court affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
3. Expropriation Exception
Finally, in Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian Federation,"9 the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia addressed the exception to sovereign
immunity for actions "in which rights in property taken in violation of international law
are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such property is owned or
operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instru-
mentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States." 120 The plaintiff,
Chabad, was a nonprofit Jewish religious organization incorporated in New York with
origins in the Russian empire. Chabad sought to recover: (1) a Library of religious texts
113. See id. at 885-87.
114. Id. at 889.
115. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
116. Rong, 452 F.3d at 890 (quoting Foremost-McKesson, 905 F.2d at 449-50).
117. See id. at 890.
118. Id.
119. Chabad v. Russian Fed'n, 466 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.C. 2006).
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
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dating back to 1772; and (2) an Archive of writings, teachings and other records belonging
to Chabad's past leaders. According to Chabad, the Library and Archive were expropri-
ated by the Russian Federation and its predecessor, the Soviet Union. As a defense to
jurisdiction, the Russian Federation asserted sovereign immunity.
The Chabad court refused to find that the expropriation exception applied to the taking
of the Library but did apply the exception to the plaintiff's claim for the Archive. Accord-
ing to the court:
in order to have jurisdiction this Court must find that: (1) "rights in property" are at
issue; (2) the property was "taken in violation of international law"; and (3) "the prop-
erty at issue (or any property exchanged for it) [is] . . . 'owned or operated by an
agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality'
engages in commercial activity in the United States." 121
The court took these prongs out of order, starting with the second. Recognizing that a
taking of property only violates international law where the property owner is an alien, the
Chabad court held that the taking of the Library was not done in violation of international
law. On the date of the original taking by the Soviet Union in 1920, the owner of the
Library was a Soviet citizen. The Chabad court rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the
Russian Federation was responsible for taking the Library in 1992, when a Russian court
order to return the Library to its owner was nullified and a decree was issued restricting
the use of the Library. According to the court, "the Library's possession and control by
the Soviet authorities for over 70 years strongly support the finding that it was, indeed,
expropriated in the 1920s, when its owner was a Soviet citizen, and its taking thus did not
violate international law."' 22
The Chabad court found that the taking of the Archive, however, was done in violation
of international law. It held that: (1) the Nazi's taking of the Archive was in violation of
international law under the holding in Bodner v. Banque Paribas;123 and (2) the Soviet
Union's subsequent taking of the Archives from the Nazis was also in violation of interna-
tional law because the Archives were "neither taken or held for a public purpose." 124 By
the time that the Soviet Union took the property, the owner had become a Latvian citizen,
and Chabad had been formed as a New York corporation. 2 5
Turning to the application of the first and third prongs of the expropriation exception
test to Chabad's claim for the Archives, the court concluded that: (1) the plaintiffs had
rights in property" to the Archives because the owner of the Archives held them in trust
for the benefit of the Chabad religious community prior to the expropriation; 126 and (2)
the Russian State Military Archive (RSMA), which held the Archives, was an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in a commercial activity, as the RSMA was
engaged in two contracts with American companies.' 27 Because Chabad's claim to the
121. Chabad, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 15 (citations omitted).
122. Id. at 19.
123. Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[T]he confiscation of private
property during the Holocaust was a violation of customary international law.") (citations omitted).
124. Chabad, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 20 (citations omitted).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 21-23.
127. Id. at 23-24.
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Archives satisfied the expropriation exception test, the court concluded it had jurisdiction
over that portion of the case and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss.1 28
IV. Forum Non Conveniens
A. INTRODUCTION
As applied in federal courts, the forum non conveniens inquiry consists of four consid-
erations.129 First, the district court must assess whether an alternative forum is available.
An alternative forum is available if the entire case and all parties can come within the
jurisdiction of that forum. Second, the district court must decide if the alternative forum
is adequate. An alternative forum is adequate if the parties will not be deprived of all
remedies or treated unfairly, even though they may not enjoy the same benefits as they
might receive in an American court. Third, if the district court decides that an alternative
forum is both available and adequate, it must then weigh various private interest factors.
Finally, if consideration of these private interest factors counsels against dismissal, the
district court moves to the fourth consideration. At this stage, the court must weigh nu-
merous public interest factors. If these factors weigh in the moving parties' favor, the
district court may dismiss the case.130
B. FORUM NON CONVENIENS DISMISSAL IN THE POSSIBLE ABSENCE OF SUBJECT-
MAYFER JURISDICTION
In 2006, there were a number of circuit court cases and a grant by the Supreme Court
of certiorari on the question of forum non conveniens dismissal in the possible absence of
subject-matter jurisdiction. In order to put these decisions in the proper context, some
background on the circuit split over this issue may be helpful. In 1999, the Supreme
Court issued a decision in Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,131 granting the lower federal
courts the discretion to dismiss an action on personal jurisdiction grounds without first
determining subject-matter jurisdiction. In the Rubrgas opinion, the Supreme Court
quoted the Third Circuit's opinion, In re Papandreou,132 as follows: "[A] court that dis-
misses on... non-merits grounds such as ... personal jurisdiction, before finding subject-
matter jurisdiction, makes no assumption of law-declaring power that violates the separa-
tion of powers underlying Mansfield and Steel Company." Significantly, among the words
omitted by the second ellipses were forum non conveniens.133 This omission raised the
128. Id. at 31. The court also refused to dismiss this portion of the case under the act of state doctrine or the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. See id.
129. In American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453, (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
doctrine of forum non conveniens was a federal common-law venue rule and was therefore procedural rather
than substantive. As a result, federal firum non conveniens law is not binding on the state courts even in cases
based on federal claims. This update will primarily focus on how the doctrine is applied in federal courts,
rather than the variations on that doctrine in state courts.
130. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Chrysler Corp., 301 F.3d 377, 379-380 (5th Cir. 2002), reearing en banc denied 51
Fed. Appx. 931, cert. denied 538 U.S. 1012 (2003).
131. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,526 U.S. 574 (1999).
132. In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
133. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584.
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question of whether, in the Supreme Court's view, forum non conveniens was among
those non-merits issues that could be decided prior to subject-matter jurisdiction.
Papandreou came to the D.C. Circuit as a petition for a writ of mandamus. In the dis-
trict court, the Greek Minister of Tourism and other Greek governmental defendants
sought dismissal on numerous grounds, including forum non conveniens. The district
court ordered discovery on the issue of sovereign immunity in order to evaluate whether it
had subject-matter jurisdiction. The D.C. Circuit found that "the district court failed to
explore the ease with which other potentially dispositive jurisdictional defenses could be
evaluated." 34 Displaying a very pragmatic attitude, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that "[i]f
one (or more) of the other jurisdictional defenses hold out the promise of being cheaply
decisive, and the defendant wants it decided first, it may well be best to grapple with it (or
them) first." 135
In post-Rubrgas decisions, the Second Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have likewise held
that a court may skip over other jurisdictional issues and dismiss on the basis of forum non
conveniens. Creating a split among the federal courts of appeal, the Fifth Circuit and the
Third Circuit have issued their own post-Ruhrgas decisions, concluding that Ruhrgas does
not permit reaching forum non conveniens before subject-matter jurisdiction.
The disagreement among the circuits boils down to a debate between a jurisdictional
hierarchy on the one hand and a pragmatic approach on the other. In Dominguez-Cota v.
Cooper Tire and Rubber Company,136 the Fifth Circuit ruled that it was unable to character-
ize forum non conveniens as a "non-merits" issue because, in assessing a motion for dis-
missal on forum non conveniens grounds, "the district court becomes entangled in the
merits of the underlying dispute" and, therefore, a forum non conveniens determination
could not be made before the court confirmed its subject-matter jurisdiction. 137
The Second Circuit pronounced its position on these questions in Monegasque de Reas-
surances SAN. (Monde Re) v. NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine.13s Subscribing to the reasoning in
Papandreou, the Monde Re court held that courts could by-pass questions of jurisdiction
and proceed directly to rule on an invocation of forum non conveniens, at least where any
jurisdictional challenge does not implicate a threshold constitutional question. 139 In 2006,
in Dattner v. Conagra Foods, Inc., the Second Circuit, noting the circuit split on these issues
and disagreeing with the contrary view articulated by the Fifth Circuit, reaffirmed its find-
ing in Monde Re that "a forum non conveniens dismissal is a non-merits decision akin to
dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction" and hence requires no antecedent verification of
jurisdiction.140
Also in 2006, the Third Circuit, in Malaysia International Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem
International Co., Ltd., staked out a slightly different position, essentially departing from
both the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit and the Second Circuit. Rejecting the Fifth Cir-
cuit's reasoning, it ruled "that forum non conveniens is a non-merits ground for dismis-
134. Papandreou, 139 F.3d at 254.
135. Id.
136. Dominguez-Cota v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 396 F.3d 650 (5th Cir. 2005).
137. Id. at 654 (quoting Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 528 (1987)).
138. Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.N. (Monde Re) v. NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488 (2d Cir.
2002). This case is commonly referred to as the Monde Re case.
139. See id. at 497.
140. Datmer v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 458 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
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sal." 14 1 The Third Circuit also disagreed with the D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit,
declaring that a ruling on a "forum non conveniens presumes that the court deciding this
issue has valid jurisdiction (both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction) and venue." 42
The Third Circuit held that district courts "must have jurisdiction before they can rule on
which forum, otherwise available, is more convenient to decide the merits."' 43
On September 26, 2006, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Sinochem on the ques-
tion of whether a district court must first conclusively establish jurisdiction before dis-
missing a suit on the ground of forum non conveniens. The case was set for argument on
January 9, 2007.
Shortly thereafter, the Seventh Circuit put in its two cents. The opinion in Intec U.S.A.,
L.L.C. v. Engle'4 weighed in on the side of pragmatism, confidently predicting that:
"[Wie expect Sinochem to turn Ruhrgas' dictum into a holding. Unlike the majority in
Sinochem, we do not read Kamel as committing this court to a rule that subject-matter
jurisdiction always must be resolved ahead of forum non conveniens." 4 5 However, in its
own act of pragmatism, the Seventh Circuit proceeded to dismiss the case for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction in the event that the "Supreme Court affirm[s] in Sinochem."146
C. CREATING UNAVAILABILITY
In 2006, in In re Bridgestone/Firestone v. Ford Motor Co., 14 7 an attempt by the plaintiffs to
demonstrate that Mexico was not an available alternative forum was rejected by the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. Previously, the Fifth Circuit seemed
to firmly establish that Mexico was an available alternative forum in Gonzalez v. Chrysler
Corp.14 8 This, however, did not reckon on the creativity of lawyers representing injured
citizens of Mexico in product liability claims. Following a number of dismissals from U.S.
courts on forum non conveniens grounds, lawyers representing Mexican plaintiffs filed
suits in various Mexican state courts. There, they obtained ex parte orders from Mexican
courts dismissing their claims for lack of territorial competence. In some cases, the plain-
tiffs went so far as to take ex parte appeals to confirm the dismissal. Armed with this proof
of the unavailability of a Mexican forum, the plaintiffs returned to the United States.
The first court to confront this issue was the Seventh Circuit in In Re Bridgestone/Fire-
stone.' 49 In the trial court, the plaintiffs stipulated to the availability of Mexico as a forum.
Vhen the case was dismissed, the plaintiffs appealed. The case was fully briefed and ar-
gued, and no argument about the availability of Mexico was raised by the plaintiffs until
141. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem Int'l Co., 436 F.3d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 2006) cert. granted, 127
U.S. 36, No. 06-102, 2006 WL 2055541 (Sep. 26, 2006).
142. Id. at 361.
143. Id. at 363-64.
144. Intec U.S.A., LLC v. Engle, 467 F.3d 1038 (7th Cir. 2006).
145. Id. at 1041.
146. Id.
147. In re Bridgestone/Firestone v. Ford Motor Co., Master File, No. IP-00-9374-C B/S, Cause No. IP 03-
5790-C-B/S, slip op. (S.D. Ind. Nov. 14, 2006).
148. Gonzalez v. Chrysler Corp., 301 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 2002). In Gonzalez, plaintiffs lawyers had argued
the $2,500 damage cap for the wrongful death of a child made a product liability case in Mexico so impractical
that it rendered Mexico an inadequate forum. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the impracticality of pursuing a
claim does not render a forum inadequate as long as the plaintiff has some remedy.
149. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 420 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2005).
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six months after oral argument. As described by the Court's opinion, this maneuver
staved off an almost certain affirmance:
Given the reasonableness of the court's conclusion and particularly given the abuse of
discretion standard of review we apply in forum non conveniens decisions, this case
looks like an easy candidate for a straightforward affirmance. But there is a wrinkle.
The parties notified this court that while this appeal was pending, the Manez-Reyes
families sued Bridgestone/Firestone and Ford in the Fourth Court of First Instance
for Civil Cases of the First Judicial District in Morelos, Mexico. That court deter-
mined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case, a ruling "confirmed" by the
Auxiliary Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of the State of Morelos. The
Morelos Court of First Instance determined that because "the defendants have their
main administration outside the territory of Mexico, [and be-cause] the acts charged
and that constitute the grounds for the lawsuit, consisting of the design and manufac-
ture of a tire and a vehicle, were performed by persons legally independent of the
person whose domicile is located within the territory of this court . . ., it is appropri-
ate to declare the lack of jurisdiction of this Court to try the matter brought before it.
Essentially, the court found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Ford and
Bridgestone/Firestone. Thus, on the face of things, it appears that the very first fo-
rum non conveniens requirement-an available alternative forum-is no longer satis-
fied. Mexico, apparently, has refused to hear the case." I50
The Seventh Circuit expressed substantial misgivings about the plaintiffs' actions.
Among other actions, the plaintiffs did not inform the defendants of the Mexican proceed-
ings nor did they inform the Morelos courts of the on-going proceedings in the United
States. Further, the State of Morelos had no relationship to the parties or the accident.
The plaintiffs insisted that they did not have to notify the defendants because:
in Mexico a defendant is notified of a lawsuit and is required to respond only pursu-
ant to a court order admitting the case for further proceedings, which is issued only
after the Mexican trial judge first makes a determination . . . that the court ... has
jurisdiction to hear the case." 5 1
Declining to accept thisfait accompli, the court opted to remand the case to the district
court for an investigation of the circumstances surrounding the proceedings in Mexico.
First, the trial court was to determine if the plaintiffs acted in good faith in prosecuting
their case in Mexico. If the court found good faith, then the trial court was to determine
whether the Mexican court decisions were otherwise entitled to recognition. If the court
found against the plaintiffs on either of these issues, the district court was to once more
dismiss the case.
Over a year later, the district court issued its decision. In an order dated November 14,
2006, U.S. District Judge Sarah Evans Barker renewed her initial order of dismissal on
forum non conveniens grounds. Prior to issuing the order, the court held a two-day evi-
dentiary hearing proceeded by a nearly year long period of discovery by the parties. Dur-
ing the discovery period, the court applied the "at issue" exception to the work product
150. Id. at 705.
151. Id. at 706.
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privilege and ordered the plaintiffs' attorneys to produce their work product related to the
proceedings in Morelos, Mexico. After reviewing the evidence, the court found that:
The evidence establishes that in filing the case in Morelos, Mexico, the attorneys for
Plaintiffs acted with the clear purpose of having the case dismissed; and, in seeking
that result, manipulated the process to insure that the dismissal would be based on a
particular reason that was calculated to improve the chances of the dismissal being
sustained on appeal. In addition, the Morelos court's conclusion that it lacked terri-
torial competency over the defendants and therefore could not try the matter pend-
ing before it was obtained in bad faith and therefore is not subject to recognition by
courts in the United States. 152
In reaching this decision the court was troubled by the plaintiffs' rationalization of their
actions in Mexico. They essentially argued that it was in their clients' best interest to win
by losing the jurisdictional issue in Mexico. In one of the key passages in her order, Judge
Barker rejects this notion:
If the law were as plaintiffs suppose, and if all plaintiffs whose claims were dismissed
on FNC grounds held to this issue, FNC dismissals would be irrelevant. A plaintiff
would simply need to go to the foreign country, file a poorly stated claim in the
wrong court and wait to have the claim dismissed. In Plaintiffs' view this would enti-
tle them to "return jurisdiction" and plaintiff would "win." Surely, this is not con-
templated by foruni non conveniens practice and procedures. Plaintiffs' desire to
litigate in a foreign state is not the same as their ability to do so. Evidence of plain-
tiffs' inability to pursue their claim in a foreign forum is only as convincing as the case
which was rejected by the foreign court. 153
Judge Barker's opinion is unlikely to be the last word in this controversy, as this same
tactic is being employed in other courts. However, between the Seventh Circuit's opinion
and Judge Barker's opinion on remand the two courts have articulated a framework for
examining a claim of unavailability based upon a putative dismissal by the alternative
forum.
V. The Act of State Doctrine
A. IN'TRODUCTION
The Act of State Doctrine cautions U.S. courts from inquiring into the validity of offi-
cial acts by a recognized sovereign power committed within its own territory. 54 The
doctrine reflects principles of international comity,155 as well as concern that the judiciary
may inadvertently interfere with the conduct of foreign policy by the political branches.156
The doctrine is limited in a number of ways. First, the doctrine applies to the public and
governmental acts of foreign sovereigns but may not apply to state action which is prima-
152. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Master File, No. IP-00-9374-C B/S, slip op at 4.
153. Id. at 9, n.13.
154. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964).
155. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765 (1972).
156. \V.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 404 (1990).
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rily private or commercial.' 5 7 Second, the doctrine does not bar all cases and controver-
sies which may embarrass foreign sovereigns or complicate foreign affairs but only applies
in actions where the relief sought or defense interposed requires a U.S. court to declare a
foreign sovereign's official act invalid. 58 Third, courts may choose not to apply the Act of
State Doctrine if controlling international law is codified or enjoys broad consensus or if
the policies underlying the doctrine are not implicated by the case at hand.' 59
Where the Act of State Doctrine applies, it directs courts to presume the validity of the
challenged acts.160 The doctrine provides foreign sovereigns with a substantive defense on
the merits with respect to which they bear the burden of persuasion.' 6' The Act of State
Doctrine provides a rule of decision rather than a doctrine of abstention, 162 and, unlike
invocation of the Political Question Doctrine or a claim of sovereign immunity, the Act of
State Doctrine does not challenge a court's jurisdiction, but simply goes to the propriety
of exercising that jurisdiction in a given case.' 63
B. ALLEGED Jus COGENS VIOLATIONS
In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, P.L.C., current and former residents of Papa New Guinea brought
an action in federal district court against Rio Tinto, P.L.C., an international mining com-
pany, alleging violations of international law and seeking recovery under the Alien Tort
Claims Act. 164 The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California applied the
Act of State Doctrine and dismissed the plaintiffs' allegations of systematic racial discrimi-
nation and violations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN-
CLOS). 165 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, finding that
systematic racial discrimination violates ajus cogens norm and, therefore, is not an official
sovereign act protected by the Doctrine. 166 The Ninth Circuit also found that the provi-
sions of the UNCLOS do not state jus cogens norms and that these alleged violations
remain official sovereign acts.' 67 The Ninth Circuit, nevertheless, vacated and remanded
in part, directing the District Court to reconsider the evidentiary value of a Statement of
Interest filed by the U.S. Department of State on which the District Court relied for its
finding that a ruling on the merits would implicate foreign relations.' 68 Finally, the Ninth
157. Compare Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1432 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that an assertion of
sovereignty requires an act in the public interest), with Honduras Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Gov't of Hondu-
ras, 129 F.3d 543, 550 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (stating that "there is no commercial exception to the act of state
doctrine").
158. See W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 406.
159. See Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at 428 (suggesting that the doctrine need not be applied if the
challenged act can be evaluated without complicating foreign relations or if the act was committed by a
foreign sovereign which no longer exists).
160. See W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 406.
161. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 691 (1976).
162. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004).
163. W.S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 406.
164. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069 (2006).
165. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal 2002).
166. See Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1085 (citing Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718 (9th
Cir. 1992)).
167. Id. at 1085-86.
168. Id. at 1100.
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Circuit suggested that the District Court confirm that the government which perpetrated
the challenged acts was still in existence.' 6
9
C. STATLrTORY ABROGATION OF THE DOCTRINE
Last year, the Year in Review reported on the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Florida's decision in Glen v. Club Mediterranee170 in which it held that the Act
of State Doctrine bars claims even between private litigants if such claims would require
the court to examine the validity of a foreign government's official act.171 In 2006, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal. 172
Glen involved an action for trespass and unjust enrichment brought by purported owners
of beachfront property confiscated by the Cuban government against a foreign corpora-
tion that later developed the confiscated property. 73 The court found that a verdict for
the Glens would require a finding that the confiscation was invalid and did not deprive the
Glens of lawful ownership of the confiscated property. 174 The court held that although
the Helms-Burton Act proclaimed the confiscations "wrongful," it did not proclaim them
legally invalid or ineffective. The court further held that the Helms-Burton Act states
that the act of state doctrine is inapplicable to a newly created statutory cause of action for
trafficking in confiscated property, but leaves the doctrine intact with respect to other
statutory or common law claims.175
D. TREATIES AND Com-rRAcTs
In Oceanic Exploration Co. v. ConocoPbillips, Inc., Oceanic Exploration Co. alleged that
ConocoPhillips, Inc., bribed Indonesian and East Timorese officials to secure and retain
rights to drill for oil and natural gas in the Timor Gap, the seabed extending between East
Timor and Australia, and to exclude Oceanic from reacquiring similar rights which it lost
following the Indonesian annexation of East Timor in 1975.176 The U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia held that a finding for Oceanic would require invalidation of
the "quintessentially sovereign prerogatives" of the newly-independent East Timor and
Australia, embodied in their Timor Sea Treaty, to divide and exploit their natural re-
sources. The court also noted that the alleged bribery did not implicate Australian offi-
cials, though the sovereign acts of both nations would be held invalid in a finding for
Oceanic.177
169. Id.
170. Phillip B. Dye, et al., International Litigation, 40 INTL. LAW. 275, 293-94 (2006).
171. Glen v. Club Mediterranee, 365 F. Supp. 2d. 1263 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
172. Glen v. Club Mediterranee, 450 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2006).
173. Id. at 1251-53.
174. Id. at 1254.
175. Id. at 1255-56.
176. Oceanic Exploration Co. v. ConocoPhillips, Inc., No. 04-332(EGS), 2006 IAL 2711527, at *1-2
(D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2006).
177. Id. at *7-8.
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VI. International Discovery
A. OBTAINL\'G U.S. DISCOVERY FOR USE IN FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS
Discovery in the United States for use in foreign proceedings is most commonly ob-
tained under 28 U.S.C. Section 1782, which provides that "[tihe district court of the dis-
trict in which a person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or
statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or
international tribunal." The statute was applied in a number of cases in 2006, many of
which are discussed below.
In Lopes v. Lopes, the defendant husband, who was involved in a divorce proceeding in
Brazil, appealed the district court's order compelling discovery under a Section 1782 sub-
poena. 78 The Brazilian court sent a letter to a U.S. bank asking for information relating
to the existence of any financial assets held in the name of the husband.' 79 The letter
formed the basis for a successful application under Section 1782, which ultimately led to
subpoenas directed at the bank mentioned in the letter as well as another bank.'8 0 The
husband moved to quash the subpoena, complaining, inter alia, that the district court: (1)
should not have granted the application because the husband was a participant in the
divorce proceeding, making aid under Section 1782 unnecessary under the first factor in
the Supreme Court's Intel decision, as the Brazilian court could obtain the requested in-
formation directly from the husband; 181 and (2) granted his wife "unprecedented and un-
authorized relief" by authorizing discovery from a bank that was not listed on the
Brazilian court's letter. 8 2 The court upheld the district court's application of the first
Intel factor, reasoning that the "person from whom discovery was sought" under Section
1782 was the bank, not the husband, and the bank was clearly not a participant in the
Brazilian proceedings and outside the jurisdiction of the Brazilian court. 83 On the second
issue, the appeals court held that it was within the discretion of the district court to in-
clude additional banks in the order, particularly as doing so effectuated the Brazilian
court's goal of "seeking the 'real truth' of the parties' assets in order to reach a fair
result."184
In Phillips v. Beierwaltes, the Tenth Circuit considered an appeal from the order of a
magistrate judge compelling production of documents under a subpoena based on Section
1782.185 The application was made by the administrators of the estate of a partner in a
London partnership who were seeking documents from U.S. nonparty clients of the part-
178. Lopes v. Lopes, 180 Fed. Appx. 874, 876 (1lth Cir. May 12, 2006)
179. Id. at 875.
180. Id.
181. The first Intel factor states:
[W]hen the person from whom discovery is being sought is a participant in the foreign proceed-
ing ... the need for § 1782(a) aid is generally not as apparent as it ordinarily is when evidence is
sought from a non-participant in the matter arising abroad. A foreign tribunal has jurisdiction
over those appearing before it, and can itself order them to produce evidence.
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264 (2004) (citations omitted).
182. Lopes, 180 Fed. Appx at 876.
183. Id. at 877.
184. Id. at 878 (citations omitted).
185. Phillips v. Beierwaltes, 466 F.3d 1217, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006).
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nership.'5 6 Although the application was made to the district court for the District of
Colorado, the application "was randomly assigned" to a magistrate judge, who granted the
application authorizing subpoenas and later granted a motion to compel production, both
issued under the designation United States District Judge. 1 7 On appeal, the court held
that because the parties had not consented to adjudication by a magistrate judge and be-
cause the district court never reviewed and acted on the order, no final appealable order
was entered under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636 and 1291, and the appellate court therefore lacked
jurisdiction to consider the appeal.' s8
In In re Xavier, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a district court's denial of a motion to
vacate an order granting the application of an administrator of a Brazilian estate to obtain
discovery from certain banks and financial institutions in the United States.' 89 The circuit
court summarily concluded that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in permitting
the discovery, holding that the district court had statutory authority under Section 1782 to
grant the discovery application and properly applied the Intel factors. 190 The decision is
noteworthy primarily because the court held that the fact the bank had already provided
the subpoenaed documents did not moot the appeal. 19 1 Relying upon the holding in
Church of Scientology of California v. United States that a case is not moot so long as "a court
can fashion some form of meaningful relief," the court held that its ability to order the
return of the documents was a meaningful remedy. -9 2
Section 1782 was also the subject of many lower court decisions. The most significant
of these are a series of actions involving Microsoft Corporation, arising from a common
set of facts. 193 In each of these, Microsoft was not permitted to obtain U.S. discovery
through Section 1782 from competitors who were parties with it to antitrust proceedings
before the European Commission. 194 Microsoft submitted ex parte applications seeking
discovery regarding communications between the parties and the European Commission
or a trustee appointed to monitor Microsoft's compliance with prior orders of the Euro-
pean Commission. 195 Each court permitted subpoenas under Section 1782.196 Upon
challenge by the other parties, however, each of the subpoenas was ultimately quashed,
with the courts concluding, inter alia, that: (1) "the subpoenas constitute[d] an attempt to
circumvent specific restrictions the European Commission ha[d] placed on Microsoft's
right to obtain certain kinds of information"; 19 7 (2) the European Commission was "not
receptive to U.S. federal court judicial assistance in this case"; 198 and (3) as a matter of
186. Id. at 1219.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1220-22.
189. In re Fabiana De Ainorim Xavier, No. 05-12218, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8132, at *1-2 (1lth Cir. Apr.
4, 2006).
190. Id. at *3.
191. Id. at *2.
192. Id. (citing Church of Scientology of California v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)).
193. In re Microsoft Corp., 428 F. Supp. 2d 188 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Microsoft Corp., No. 06-10061-
MLW, 2006 WL 1344091 (D. Mass. Apr. 19, 2006); In re Microsoft Corp., No. C 06-80038JF (PVT), 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24870 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2006).
194. See, e.g., In re Microsoft Corp., 428 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
195. Id. at 190-192.
196. Id.
197. In re Microsoft Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24870, at *10.
198. Id. at *11.
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comity, the court was unwilling to order discovery "when doing so w[ould] interfere with
the European Commission's orderly handling of its own enforcement proceedings." 199
B. OBTAINING DISCOVERY FROM ABROAD FOR USE IN" U.S. PROCEEDINGS
In Promotional Containers, Inc. v. Aztec Concrete Accessories, Inc., a patent infringement
case, the court considered an objection to the taking of a deposition on notice of a third
party-the corporate representative of a German company-in Germany.2 00 The com-
plaining party, Promotional Containers, argued that Aztec was required to use the proce-
dures set out in Hague Evidence Convention,20' Aztec served letters rogatory on the
German authorities but expressed preference for taking the deposition on notice because
it would be quicker and would allow Aztec to question the witness directly and to obtain a
verbatim transcript of the deposition.2 02 The court held that Aztec was permitted to take
the deposition on notice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 28(b), as the Hague Evidence Convention
was not the exclusive method to obtain discovery abroad03 The court relied on the facts
that the German company official was submitting to the deposition voluntarily, there was
no indication that the deposition would violate German law, and the German official was
not acquiescing to the court's jurisdiction by agreeing to be deposed.204
In the continuing litigation of Estate of Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, involving judg-
ment creditors of an estate, the court was faced with a belated motion by two third-party
witnesses to quash deposition subpoenas ad testificandum that would have required the
witnesses to travel to the United States in violation of the "100 mile" rule of Fed. R. Civ.
P 45(c)(3)(A)(ii)2 05 The witnesses had been served properly and were therefore subject to
the court's jurisdiction.20 6 After rejecting other options as unfeasible or impermissible,
the court directed the witnesses to respond to a written information subpoena under N.Y.
CPLR Section 5224 (2006).207 The court reasoned that this procedure was permitted
under Second Circuit law for actions related to the enforcement of a judgment such as this
one and would allow direct questions to be posed to the witnesses and thereby preserve
the testimonial aspect of the deposition. 20 8
199. Id. at *12.
200. Promotional Containers, Inc. v. Aztec Concrete Accessories, Inc., No. Civ. A. 04-336-JBC, 2006 WL




204. Id. at "2,
205. Estate of Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, 451 F. Supp. 2d 607, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Rule
45(c)(3)(A)(ii) provides, in relevant part, that a court "shall" quash or modify a subpoena if it "requires a
person who is not a party or an officer of a party to travel to a place more than 100 miles from the place where
that person resides, is employed or regularly transacts business in person[.]"
206. Id. at 609.
207. Id. at 612. The two other options the court rejected were: (1) directing that the nonparty wimesses
would appear for a deposition at a mutually agreeable place, which the court did not deem feasible; and (2)
direct the deposition to take place in a particular location, which the court concluded was likely outside its
power as Rule 45 requires a subpoena to issue from "the district in which the deposition is to be taken" and
Rule 28(b) does not give the court the power to compel a party to submit to oral examination in a foreign
country. Id.
208. ld.
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A number of courts in 2006, following the Supreme Court's Aerospatiale decision,209
rejected attempts to require the use of the Hague Evidence Convention to obtain docu-
ments where the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were available:
* In Jones v. Deutsche Bank AG, the Northern District of California held that resort-
ing to the Hague Evidence Convention was optional and required a party to pro-
duce documents held in its foreign offices where requests only put limited burdens
on a sophisticated "international entity with worldwide operations" and would not
"seriously impair the sovereign interests of other nations";210
" In In re Vivendi Universal, S.A., the Southern District of New York held that comity
considerations and a French blocking statute did not justify resort to Hague Evi-
dence Convention, particularly where the blocking statute "was never expected nor
intended to be enforced against French subjects but was intended rather to provide
them with tactical weapons and bargaining chips in foreign courts";21' and
" In In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd., the Southern District of New York held that a
company's former senior executive over whom the court had jurisdiction had "con-
trol" over company documents located outside the United States and was required
to produce the documents under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 without need for resort to
Hague Evidence Convention. 2 12
C. INTFERNATIONAL ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
On December 1, 2006, revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to address
electronic discovery issues went into effect. The amendments alter the Federal Rules in a
number of ways, including by adding a specific reference to electronic media and requir-
ing parties to focus on electronic discovery early in the litigation. The increased focus on
electronic discovery likely will have a parallel effect on international discovery issues.
Certain long-standing matters, such as privacy concerns in European nations, will likely
be in conflict with the discovery requirements of the new rules. Issues such as the ade-
quacy of retention policies in countries with less sophisticated electronic document man-
agement practices are also likely to pose greater difficulties for foreign parties involved in
U.S. litigation. 2 13
209. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. D. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522
(1987).
210. Jones v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. C 04 5357 JW (RS), 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14631, at *11-13 (N.D. Ca.
Mar. 10, 2006) (Magistrate Judge Memo.).
211. In re Vivendi Universal, S.A., No. 02CIV5571RJHHBP, 2006 WL 3378115, at *2-4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
16, 2006) (Magistrate Judge Memo.) (quoting Adidas (Canada) Ltd. v. SS Seatrain Bennington, Nos. 80 Civ.
1911 (PNL), 80 Civ. 0375 (PNL), 1984 WL 423, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 1984)).
212. In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd., 236 F.R.D. 177, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
213. Efforts to develop harmonized international standards and best practices can be seen, for example, in
the Sedona Conference's The Sedona Guidelines for Managing Information and Records in the Electronic Age
(2005), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org.
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VII. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law
A. INTIRODUCTION
In determining whether to apply U.S. law extraterritorially, courts are guided by the
principles articulated in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations. As expressed in
the Restatement, a State may exercise prescriptive jurisdiction where the conduct in ques-
tion "has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory."214 A State should
not, however, exercise its prescriptive jurisdiction extraterritorially if doing so would be
unreasonable. 215 The following factors are relevant when considering whether exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction is reasonable: (1) whether the activity has "substantial, direct,
and foreseeable effect" on the regulating State; (2) the connection between the regulating
State and the person engaging in the activity in question; (3) the character of the activity,
the importance of regulation to the regulating State, the extent of regulation by other
States, and whether such regulation is generally accepted; (4) the existence of justified
expectations; (5) the importance of the regulation internationally; (6) consistency with
international custom; (7) other States' interests in regulating the activity; and (8) conflict
with regulation by a foreign jurisdiction. 2 16
In the past year, U.S. courts have applied these principles to a wide variety of fields, and
have considered extraterritoriality in disputes involving constitutional claims, labor stan-
dards, criminal statutes, securities law, and bankruptcy.
B. CONsITrrUIONAL CLAWMS
In Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L 'antisemitisme, the Ninth Circuit, sitting
en banc, addressed, inter alia, the issue of whether the First Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution had extraterritorial effect. 2 17 Although the court did not reach a conclusion on
this issue, 2 18 it was significant to the court that "the French court's orders require, by their
terms, only a limitation on access to anti-Semitic materials by users located in France."219
Yahoo! asserted that it was not technically feasible to distinguish between users in various
countries and that full compliance with the French court's orders would necessarily re-
strict access by at least some internet users in the United States. The court was not per-
suaded and found that the only issue was whether the First Amendment applies
extraterritorially to users in France. 22°
Although the court acknowledged that harm could result from a chilling effect on pro-
tected speech, the court concluded that any harm Yahoo! suffered in this regard was lim-
ited or nonexistent, as Yahoo! had stated that the hate speech policies it adopted were
214. RESTATEMENT (THIIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402 (1987).
215. Id. §403(1).
216. Id. § 403(2).
217. Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1200.
218. The court found that it was uncertain at that stage in the proceedings whether or in what form a First
Amendment issue would be presented to it, as the French court had not issued further directives to Yahoo!.
Id. at 1217-18.
219. Id. at 1216 (emphasis in original).
220. Id. at 1217.
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motivated by considerations other than the French court's orders. 22' Even if the French
court required further compliance with its orders, the court reasoned Yahoo! would only
be required to restrict access to users located in France. 222 Lacking a finding by the
French court that Yahoo! was not in compliance with its orders and without a directive to
Yahoo! to take any particular action, the court could not determine what effect, if any,
Yahoo!'s compliance would have on American internet users or whether enforcement of
the orders would be repugnant to California public policy; thus, a plurality of the en banc
panel deemed the action unripe.
2 23
The primary differences between the members of the en banc panel regarding the First
Amendment issue stemmed from the belief by the plurality that the French court's orders
required that Yahoo! take actions only in France, whereas the dissent viewed the French
court's orders as requiring Yahoo! to take actions in the United States, as Yahoo! argued
they did. The dissent also viewed the plurality opinion as improperly imposing a burden
on Yahoo! to exhaust its challenges in France before asserting its First Amendment rights
in the United States2 24 and to identify speech in which it otherwise would have engaged
but was prevented by the French court's orders.2 25 Such a requirement, the dissent rea-
soned, places a "new, higher burden" on the plaintiffs for proving the chilling effect of the
defendant's actions.
226
The extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment was at issue in Arar v. Ash-
croft.227 Authorities in the United States detained the plaintiff, a dual Syrian-Canadian
citizen with suspected ties to a terrorist organization, during a layover on an international
flight. The plaintiff alleged the United States removed him to Syria to be tortured and
interrogated in violation of his substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.
The plaintiff sought damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau
of Narcotics.228 The court dismissed the claims, concluding that whether the Fifth Amend-
ment applied extraterritorially was unresolved, 229 but the national security and foreign
policy considerations counseled that this issue be left to the executive and legislative
branches.2 30 "[V]ith respect to these coordinate branch concerns, there is a fundamental
difference between courts evaluating the legitimacy of actions taken by federal officials in
the domestic arena and evaluating the same conduct when taken in the international
realm."231
In Rasul v. Rumsfeld, the court held that Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
applied to non-U.S. citizen detainees at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay,
221. Id. at 1220.
222. Id. at 1221.
223. Id. at 1216-17.
224. Id. at 1235 (Fisher, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
225. Id. at 1251.
226. Id.
227. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), certification denied, Arar v. Ashcroft, No. CV-
04-0249, 2006 WL 1875375 (E.D.N.Y. Jul 05, 2006).
228. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 267; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
229. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 278 (considering Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) and In re Guantanamo
Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 463 (D.D.C. 2005) (involving habeas petitions of detainees at the U.S.
military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)).
230. Id. at 281.
231. Id. at 282.
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Cuba. 232 In rejecting defendants' motions to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, the court concluded that RFRA applied to territo-
ries of the United States, that the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station constituted a territory
of the United States, and that RFRA applied to nonresident aliens.
C. LABOR STANDARDS
In Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp.,233 the First Circuit concluded the whistleblower
protection provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act2 34 did not have extraterritorial effect. The
plaintiff was a citizen of Argentina employed by foreign subsidiaries of a U.S. company.
The alleged fraudulent actions were instituted in Latin America, and the majority of the
plaintiffs duties were performed outside the United States. The court found the plain-
tiff's claims would fit generally within the whistleblower protection provision, but because
the statute was silent with respect to its territorial reach, the court relied on the presump-
tion against extraterritorial application articulated in E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil
Co. 235 The court noted that Congress had provided explicitly for extraterritorial enforce-
ment elsewhere in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.2 36 The court further considered that giving
extraterritorial application to the whistleblower provision would empower U.S. courts and
agencies "to delve into the employment relationship between foreign employers and their
foreign employees" 2 37 and would run afoul of "the well-established principle of sover-
eignty . . . that no nation has the right to impose its labor standards on another
country."238
In Ofori-Tenkorang v. American International Group, Inc.,239 the Second Circuit con-
cluded, in a case of first impression at the appellate level, that the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, did not provide recovery for an employer's racially dis-
criminatory conduct against an employee employed by a U.S. company overseas. The
court found the plain language, structure, and history of Section 1981 evidenced Con-
gress's intent to confer rights under Section 1981 only on persons within U.S. states and
territories. 240
Relying on Ofori-Tenkorang, the District Court for the Southern District of New York,
in Arias-Zeballos v. Tan,24 1 rejected a Section 1981 claim brought by a plaintiff, a U.S.
citizen residing in New York, against her employer, a citizen of Singapore. The plaintiff
alleged the defendant retaliated against her after the plaintiff objected to the defendant's
treatment, via telephone, of the defendant's domestic employees in Singapore. The dis-
trict court concluded that Section 1981 only prohibits discriminatory retaliation "where
232. Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 433 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2006).
233. Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006).
234. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2002).
235. Carnero, 433 F.3d at 7; E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
236. Carnero, 433 F.3d at 8.
237. Id. at 15.
238. Id. (quoting S. REP. 98-467, at 27-28 (1984)).
239. Ofori-Tenkorang v. American Int'l Group, Inc., 460 F.3d 296, 307 (2d Cir. 2006).
240. Id. at 301.
241. Arias-Zeballos v. Tan, No. 06 CIV. 1268 (GEL), 2006 WIL 3075528 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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the underlying conduct to which a plaintiff objects is itself prohibited, or where the plain-
tiff has a good faith, reasonable belief that the conduct is prohibited." 242
D. SECURITIES
The District Court for the District of Delaware declined to apply the securities laws
extraterritorially in Blecbner v. Daimler-Benz AG.243 In the potential class action suit, the
plaintiffs, who were foreign investors, brought an action for securities fraud involving the
merger of a U.S. company, Chrysler, and a German company, Daimler-Benz. In granting
the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court concluded, inter alia, that the presumption
against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law applied because: (1) the securities laws
are silent with respect to extraterritorial application; (2) the conduct at issue was primarily
in Germany, not the United States, and the shareholders had no connection to the United
States; (3) the outcome would not affect U.S. investors or markets; and (4) other countries
may have a greater interest in regulating the actions at issue within their borders. Addi-
tionally, because the case was a potential class action, the court declined to exercise juris-
diction to avoid the peculiar problems that could result from an exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction over a class of foreign plaintiffs.
E. BANKRuPTcY
In In re Frencb,2 44 a U.S. bankruptcy court held that it had jurisdiction to avoid an
allegedly fraudulent transfer between U.S. citizens of real property located in a foreign
jurisdiction. The court found the presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply,
and the doctrine of international comity would not preclude application of the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Code. The debtor had transferred a house in the Bahamas to her children, who
recorded the deed after the debtor was insolvent. The court determined that the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality would not apply because it was clear from the text of
the statute that Congress intended the statute to apply to transfers of property of an estate,
wherever located. Further, application of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to Bahamian prop-
erty would not interfere with principles of international comity because the United States
had the stronger interest in the transaction. 245 Judge Wilkinson concurred with the ma-
jority's reasoning, adding that "it is unlikely that Congress would desire to accord an
invariable exemption from the Code's operation to those who leave our borders to engage
in fraud." 246 The Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 20, 2006.247
While the petition for certiorari was pending, a bankruptcy court in California ad-
dressed the same issue. 248 That court rejected the Fourth Circuit's interpretation in In re
French, and concluded that the statute, read on its face and in conjunction with other
relevant provisions, did not evidence Congress's intent to apply the provision extraterrito-
rially. Further, the court held that policy considerations, alone, were not sufficient to
242. Id. at *6.
243. Blechner v. Daimler-Benz AG, 410 F. Supp. 2d 366 (D. Del. 2006).
244. In re French, 440 F.3d 145 (4th Cir. 2006).
245. Id. at 154.
246. Id. at 155 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
247. French v. Liebmann, 127 S. Ct. 72 (2006).
248 Midland Euro Exchange, Inc. v. Swiss Finance Corp. Ltd., 347 B.R. 708 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
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overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. In so ruling, the court stated that
there exists, in its view, a loophole in the Bankruptcy Code that "allows dishonest debtors
to avoid the reach of the U.S. bankruptcy system by hiding the assets abroad."249
VIII. Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Judgments
A. INT RODUCTION
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(New York Convention or the Convention) governs the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards in U.S. courts.2 50 The enforcement of foreign judgments, how-
ever, falls within the realm of state law. In enforcing foreign judgments, courts generally
apply the principles of comity set forth in Hilton v. Guyot.25 1 Many states have adopted the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (Uniform Act), which largely codi-
fies the Hilton principles, to enforce foreign court money judgments.
B. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
1. Modification of Foreign Arbitral Awards
In Adnart AG v. Stephen & Mary Birch Foundation, the Third Circuit addressed a court's
ability to modify the execution of an arbitration award under the New York Conven-
tion. 252 The Stephen and Mary Birch Foundation (Birch), a Delaware not-for-profit cor-
poration, entered into an agreement to buy an open-air exhibit of artwork. The sale
agreement, executed in 1990, was governed by Swiss law and provided that disputes would
be arbitrated in Zurich, Switzerland. 253 Birch subsequently claimed it had not received
adequate evidence of Admart's clear title, and the parties commenced arbitration in Zu-
rich in 1991. In 1994, a Swiss arbitration panel issued its Final Award, ordering Birch to
pay Admart the outstanding balance of $3 million on simultaneous exchange of the art-
work. The award also ordered Admart to deposit the artwork with a third-party storage
company pending payment.
Birch appealed to the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, which affirmed the award in 1996.
While the Swiss appeal was pending, Admart filed in the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Delaware to confirm the award under the New York Convention. The district
court stayed the proceedings, pending the Swiss court appellate decision, until 2003. In
2004, the district court confirmed the award. 254
On appeal to the Third Circuit, Birch argued two issues. First, Birch argued the district
court erred in refusing to stay the proceedings pending a decision in Birch's second re-
quest for arbitration in Switzerland.255 The second arbitration request concerned Birch's
249. Id. at 720.
250. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 1, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
251. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
252. Admart AG v. Stephen & Mary Birch Found., 457 F.3d 302 (3d Cir. 2006).
253. Id. at 304.
254. Id. at 305.
255. Id. at 306.
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claim for damages to the art and loss of profits for the period of time since the award was
delivered. The Third Circuit, however, ruled that the district court was not required to
delay or adjourn the proceedings because the issues of the second arbitration did not suffi-
ciently overlap with the enforcement of the award. 256
Second, Birch argued that the district court improperly modified the award. On this
issue, the Third Circuit emphasized that refusal to recognize a foreign arbitral award
should be allowed only on grounds explicitly set forth in Article V of the New York Con-
vention.257 The court noted that the execution of an award, however, is allowed more
flexibility, provided the substance of the award is not altered.258 The court stated that
although the district court judgment was consistent with the substance of the award, the
terms of the district court's order varied from those set out by the arbitrators. The court
concluded that because ten years had passed between the award and the district court's
confirmation, any modification to the award should have adhered as closely to the text of
the award as possible.259
2. Non-Enforcement Based on Appeal of Award in Foreign Forum
In Telcordia Tech, Inc. v. Telkom SA Ltd., the Third Circuit addressed the district court's
dismissal without prejudice of a petition to confirm a partial award made in South Africa
according to the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). 2 6 0 In Septem-
ber 2002, the ICC's International Court of Arbitration issued its final award in favor of
Telcordia, a telecommunications company based in New Jersey. Prior to the ICC's final
award, Telkom, a South African telecommunications company, sought intervention from
the South African High Court. In November 2003, the South African High Court set
aside the award and ordered a new arbitration. In November 2004, the Supreme Court of
Appeal of South Africa agreed to hear an appeal from Telcordia. While the appeal in
South Africa was pending, Telcordia also petitioned the District of New Jersey to enforce
the arbitral award. 261 The district court exercised its discretion not to enforce the award
pursuant to Article VI of the New York Convention because the decision of the arbitrator
had been set aside by the High Court of South Africa, a competent authority of the coun-
try in which or under the law of which the award was made. The Third Circuit affirmed
the district court yet based its decision on the fact that an appeal was still outstanding
before the South African Supreme Court.262
256. Id.
257. Id. at 306.
258. Id. at 309.
259. Id. at 310.
260. Telcordia Tech, Inc. v. Telkom SA Ltd., 458 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2006).
261. Id. at 176. Telcordia had previously petitioned the D.C. District Court, which had dismissed the peti-
tion without prejudice based on lack of personal jurisdiction over Telkom. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the
district court's ruling.
262. Id. at 181.
SUMMER 2007
362 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
C. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS
1. Recognition Based on Lack of Repugnance to Public Policy
In Society of Lloyd's v. Siemon-Netto, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's grants
of summary judgment enforcing money judgments obtained in England. 263 Several other
circuits had previously ruled on cases involving Lloyd's and multiple American insurance
underwriters (referred to as "Names") for nonpayment of reinsurance premiums. 264 In
Siemon-Nettos, the English High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, entered
money judgments against Siemon-Nettos in favor of Lloyd's. Lloyd's then petitioned the
District Court of the District of Columbia to enforce the judgments. Siemon-Nettos as-
serted the affirmative defense that the foreign-money judgment was repugnant to the pub-
lic policy of the District of Columbia because the cause of action on which they were
based conflicted with the public policy of the District of Columbia. 265
The court applied Section 15-383(b)(3) of the Recognition Act, which is based on the
Uniform Act and states that non-recognition of a foreign judgment is permitted only if
the cause of action on which it is based is repugnant to public policy.26 6 The cause of
action in Siemon-Nettos involved English contract law. The court concluded that the core
principles of English contract law, from which American contract law is derived, are not
repugnant to public policy. 267 The court also concluded that the legislation upon which
the cause of action was based, Lloyd's Act of 1982, was not repugnant to the District of
Columbia's public policy. 26s
2. Recognition Based on Principles of International Comity
In Daewoo Motor America, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., the Eleventh Circuit addressed
whether the district court abused its discretion in dismissing claims by Daewoo Motor
America, Inc. (Daewoo America) on grounds of international comity. 269 Daewoo
America, a wholly owned subsidiary of Daewoo Korea, was the exclusive distributor of
Daewoo automobiles in the United States and the exclusive provider of warranties and
replacement parts.2 70 In 2000, Daewoo Korea filed for bankruptcy in Korea. The Korean
court appointed a receiver and ordered the commencement of the reorganization proce-
dure.2 71 Daewoo Korea informed Daewoo America of its reorganization plans. In 2002,
General Motors (GM), Daewoo Korea, and the creditors of Daewoo Korea created a
Master Transaction Agreement (MTA) that created a new company, GM Daewoo Auto-
motive and Technology Company (GMDAT), to acquire assets of Daewoo Korea, includ-
ing plants at which Daewoo manufactured automobiles for export to the United States.2 7 2
263. Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Siemon-Netto, 457 F.3d 94 (DC Cir. 2006).
264. Id. at 95-96. See Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 2005); Lipcon v. Underwriters at
Lloyd's, 148 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1998); Richard v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998).
265. Soc'y of Lloyd's, 457 F.3d at 99.
266. Id.; D.C. CODF § 15-383(b)(3)(2001).
267. Soc'y of Lloyd's, 457 F.3d at 100.
268. Id. at 102.
269. Daewoo Motor Am., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 459 F.3d 1249 (11th Cit. 2006).
270. Id. at 1252.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1253.
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Despite notice, Daewoo America did not attend the proxy meeting to vote for or against
the MTA or the reorganization plan.2 73 The Korean court subsequently adopted and ap-
proved the MTA and the reorganization plan in September 2002.
Daewoo America brought an action in the United States against GM and GMDAT in
2004, asserting that its legal rights as exclusive dealer for Daewoo were violated.2 74 The
district court granted comity to the Korean court's ruling for three reasons: (1) Korea has
a significant interest in regulating business activity on its shores; (2) differences between
Korean and U.S. bankruptcy.law are minimal and do not violate due process; and (3)
Daewoo had notice, and a full and fair opportunity to participate in all facets of the Ko-
rean bankruptcy process.2 75 The Eleventh Circuit, relying on the principles of comity set
forth in Hilton, noted that because international comity is an abstention doctrine, the dis-
trict court's ruling was subject to review only for abuse of discretion. 276 The court found
that Daewoo America did not identify any public policy notion offended by the district
court's ruling.2 77 Moreover, the court concluded that the district court had not erred in
finding that Daewoo America had adequate notice of the Korean bankruptcy proceedings,
and thereby affirmed the district court's ruling.278
273. Id. at 1254.
274. Daewoo Motor Am., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 315 B.R. 148 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
275. Daewoo Motor Am., Inc., 459 F.3d at 1255.
276. Id. at 1256.
277. Id. at 1258.
278. Id.
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